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ARGUMENT
APPELLEE'S BRIEF CONTINUES TO ADVANCE AN ERRONEOUS
APPLICATION OF THOMPSON V. JESS.
Appellee contends that the facts of Thompson v. Jess, 1999 UT 22, 979 P.2d 322
(Utah 1999), "parallel" those of the instant case and that Thompson must therefore be
applied in deciding this matter. See Appellee's Brief at 9,12. While the Appellee
faithfully recites the relevant facts of that case (see Appellee's Brief at 7-8), in advancing
Thompson's application, Appellee completely disregards the fact that the claim in
Thompson was based upon the contention that the landowner was guilty of negligence in
the control she exercised over the installation of a large sign post and in failing to take or
require special precautions in its installation. See Thompson, 1999 UT 22 at ff 7-8. The
claim in Thompson had nothing to do with any unsafe condition existing on the premises

1

in question. Beckstead argues:
Appellee does not dispute that there is some conflict between the cases
relied upon by Hale and Thompson regarding the duty of care. This conflict
is due in part to case law which stands for the proposition that a workman
who comes onto land to make improvements, alterations, or repairs is owed
a duty of care by the landowner which is equivalent to that owed to a
regular invitee. [Citation omitted.]
The fact remains, however, that in Thompson, the most recent case
addressing the duty of care owed in circumstances as are present in the
instant case, the Utah Supreme Court applied section 409 of the
Restatement and its exceptions as set forth above. It did not cite to or
address sections 343 and 343 A of the Restatement or Hale's [sic] possible
status as an invitee. Therefore, because the facts in the instant case parallel
those in Thompson, Thompson must be applied, and its application results in
a finding that Beckstead owed Hale no duty of care.
Appellee's Brief at 12.
What the Appellee insists upon overlooking is the fact that Thompson did not
involve the existence of a dangerous condition on the premises which was created or
existed independent of the manner in which the contractor undertook his performance.
The language of the Thompson opinion clearly demonstrates that the case was decided by
application of the legal principles set out in Chapter 15, Topic 2 (HARM CAUSED BY
NEGLIGENCE OF A CAREFULLY SELECTED INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR)

of the Restatement

(Second) of Torts (1965). The instant case is governed by the application of the legal
principles outlined in Chapter 13, Topic 1 (LIABILITY OF POSSESSORS OF LAND TO
PERSONS ON THE LAND) of the Restatement. Under the undisputed facts of the instant

case, the Defendant was clearly the "possessor" of the real property in question. See, id. §
328E defining "possessor." Moreover, it is apparent that Plaintiff was Beckstead's
"invitee." See English v, Kienke, 848 P.2d 153, 156-57 (Utah 1993) (referring to the
2

Restatement rule as "the safe workplace doctrine"). The duty Beckstead, as a possessor
of land, owed Hale, as his invitee, is set forth in sections 343 and 343 A of the
Restatement.
While Appellee seems to concede the possibility that sections 343 and 343A might
have some application in deciding the instant case, he attempts to distinguish cases which
have applied the premises liability principles outlined in Chapter 13, Topic 1, of the
Restatement Second. In questioning the relevance of Laws v. Blanding City, 893 P.2d
1083 (Utah App.1995), Beckstead attempts to distinguish the case on the basis that Hale
was an independent contractor while the plaintiff inlaws was not, at the same time
apparently conceding that Hale enjoyed the status of a business invitee. See Appellee's
Brief at 11. Appellee then goes on to contend that "Beckstead is certainly not a
governmental entity or public utility under which the duty of care, as implied by the court
in Laws, is perhaps greater than that expected of a private property owner or general
contractor." See id. Appellee cites no authority indicating and conducts no legal analysis
suggesting that the duty of care owed by a governmental entity or public utility is
"perhaps" greater than that owed by a private property owner or general contractor.1
1

Although the district court recognized Hale's status as a "business visitor or
invitee" (R 102), it undertook no analysis of the legal consequences of that conclusion.
Indeed, in a footnote on page 3 of its ruling the lower court noted:
This court is fully aware of the now-frequent instruction of the appellate
courts for the trial courts to make a more extensive analysis in rulings such
as this. See, e.g., Gabriel v. Salt Lake City Corp., 2001 UT App 277, 431
Utah Adv. Rep, 7. That instruction is not always realistic, however. First,
the caseloads of the trial courts continue to increase while many courts'
time and resources remain stagnant; for example, the judicial resources in
this district have remained the same for over 12 years in spite of the
overwhelming growth in the population and case filings in the district.
3

CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the Appellee and the district court have
erroneously relied upon legal authority which has no application to the facts of this case
and that the order granting Defendant summary judgment must be reversed and the case
remanded for trial.
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DATED this I ' day of January, 2003.

isbrey
Attorney for Plaintiff and Appellant

Second, appellate reviews of summary judgment decisions of the Utah
district courts resulted in a reversal rate well over 50% in reported cases
decided in the Utah appellate courts in the year 2000. In light of the huge
caseloads carried by the trial courts, the time required for the drafting of a
detailed ruling, which is more likely to be reversed than to be affirmed, is
often too great a luxury for a trial judge to afford.
R102,fh2.
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